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A No vote in Ireland’s referendum on the Fiscal Treaty might
contribute to the demise of the current mindset of austerity.
May 31 2012
Polling in the lead up to Ireland’s vote on the Fiscal Stability Treaty has pointed to the
endorsement of the Treaty. But will the Treaty be a positive force for Ireland, and for Europe?
Simon Wren-Lewis argues that the Treaty is ultimately flawed as it treats the current crisis
as stemming from massive public sector debts, whilst ignoring that these debts come from
governments’ bailouts of banks that were under threat due to unsustainable borrowing from
the private sector.
Today Ireland votes on the Fiscal Stability Treaty. Polls suggest the result will be yes. Will this
be a solid endorsement for the clauses of the Treaty, and the vision that lies behind it? I doubt
it very much. What may be much more decisive is a clause that only allows access to Europe’s new bailout
fund to states that ratify the treaty. Given Ireland’s current situation, you could say that voters have very little
choice but to vote yes. In addition, I have read quite a few posts over the past few weeks (e.g. John
McHale here) suggesting that the Treaty does not impose any additional burdens to the austerity Ireland is
already implementing. In that sense, there is no immediate cost in voting yes, if you think the current austerity
is unavoidable.
If that is the immediate cost benefit
calculus, what about the longer term?
Philip Lane writes “My own take is that, if
the Treaty is implemented in an intelligent,
cyclically-sensitive manner (consistent
with the flexible, holistic interpretation laid
out in the “six pack” regulations), the new
fiscal framework will be a positive force,
helping Ireland and other European
countries to gradually exit from high debt
levels and avoid destabilising pro-cyclical
fiscal policies in the future.”
Unfortunately, I think you could also argue
exactly the opposite. If the Treaty is
implemented in an unintelligent manner,
with an attempt to satisfy all its numerous
rules and clauses without regard to
macroeconomic context, the results could
be disastrous. (If you want an example of
how this can happen, see the
Netherlands.) As I have suggested before, the Treaty is similar to the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). True,
compared to the original SGP, the emphasis on cyclically adjusted deficits gives formal acknowledgement of
the importance of automatic stabilisers. More generally, whereas in the original Pact there were two main
criteria for budget deficits, now there are many more (see here, or here). That can be read as flexibility, or it
can be interpreted as confusion, muddle and bad economics. Hence both optimistic views like Philip’s and
more pessimistic readings (see Karl Whelan here for example) are possible.
What I believe is clear is the overall vision that the Treaty represents. It sees the essential problem with the
Eurozone as being public sector indulgence. This is a profound misreading of what happened before the
recession. By far the bigger problem for most periphery countries was private sector indulgence fuelled by
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cheap borrowing. In Ireland, and now in Spain, this transforms itself into a public sector problem because
banks are bailed out.
The fact that it was excess private sector borrowing that was the
ultimate cause of the crisis does not mean that fiscal policy was
appropriate. Far from it. Fiscal policy should have been much
tighter than it was, because it needed to be countercyclical.
However, the idea of countercyclical fiscal policy was nowhere to
be found in the original SGP, and hardly figures in the Treaty. If the
Treaty had been a realistic response to the current crisis, issues to
do with macroeconomic stability (e.g. relative inflation rates, real
exchange rate disequilibrium) would be at its centre, rather than as
the vaguely worded single paragraph that is Article 9.
This failure in both the original SGP and the new Treaty to
recognise how important countercyclical fiscal policy is to the
viability of the Euro is a major, perhaps the major, design flaw. (I
have written about this before, but for a similar message see here.)
What is worse, the obsession with public sector profligacy has
diverted Eurozone policymakers from understanding this, both
before and during the crisis. It has also discouraged recognising
the scale of the problems facing the banking sector, and indeed the
obsession with austerity has probably made this problem worse.
One response to this argument is political. Yes, the Treaty is a
distraction, but it is a pre-requisite for other important reforms of
the euro system.  In simple language, the Treaty is needed
because without it there is no chance of persuading Germany to
even think about Eurobonds and the like. But perhaps what has to
change is this German (and Dutch, and Finnish) mindset. As long
as the ‘fiscal irresponsibility’ story remains the dominant narrative,
we will get either continuing policy inertia, or worse still games of
chicken being played with national electorates. That road may lead
to disaster, as Boone and Johnson argue here. There needs to be a collective realisation that the causes of
the crisis are not as originally advertised. There are solutions (e.g. Nick Stern here), but they require Germany
and others to put Euro survival ahead of national self-interest. With the election of Hollande, there is a chance
of this happening. In this context you could argue that an Irish yes vote does nothing to help change the
austerity mindset, whereas a no vote might have contributed to the mindset’s demise.
That is easy for me to write. It is also easy for me to conjecture from the other side of the Irish Sea that if
Ireland voted no, this would make no difference to their ability to receive bail-out funds. Ireland has been the
poster boy for the ‘austerity’ cure, and for this and many other reasons the Eurozone is not going to let the
little matter of a popular referendum make them throw Ireland to the market wolves. However, I can quite
understand that, given what Ireland has been through, it would not want to take that risk for what would, I
admit, be little more than a gesture. It may also be that, ironically, Ireland’s opportunity to argue that the Treaty
is a dangerous distraction is greater if it votes yes. If the vote is yes, it must take that opportunity.
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